MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Amplifying Comments on Planners' Paper for Presentation to the President.

The following points are arranged seriatim in accordance with the appearance of the same subjects in the paper the Planners propose for presentation to the President:

1. Our air and sea power has already greatly reduced movement of Jap shipping south of Korea and should in the next few months cut it to a trickle if not choke it off entirely. Hence, there is no need for seizing further positions in order to block Japanese communications south of Korea.

2. General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz are in agreement with the Chiefs of Staff in selecting 1 November as the target date to go into Kyushu because by that time:

   a. If we press preparations we can be ready.

   b. Our estimates are that our air action will have smashed practically every industrial target worth hitting in Japan as well as destroying huge areas in the Jap cities.

   c. The Japanese Navy, if any still exists, will be completely powerless.

   d. Our sea action and air power will have cut Jap reinforcement capabilities from the mainland to negligible proportions.

Important considerations bearing on the 1 November date rather than a later one are the weather and cutting to a minimum Jap time for preparation of defenses. If we delay much after the beginning of November the weather situation in the succeeding months may be such that the invasion of Japan, and hence the end of the war, will be delayed for up to 6 months.

3. An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Pusan in the southeast corner and Keijo, well up the western side. To get to Pusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large
and vulnerable assault forces past heavily fortified Japanese defenses. The operation appears more difficult and costly than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and costly operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu.

4. The Kyushu operation is essential to a strategy of strangle and appears to be the least costly worth-while operation following Okinawa. The basic point is that a lodgement in Kyushu is essential, both to tightening our stranglehold of blockade and bombardment on Japan, and to forcing capitulation by invasion of the Tokyo Plain.

5. We are bringing to bear against the Japanese every weapon and all the force we can employ and there is no reduction in our maximum possible application of bombardment and blockade, while at the same time we are pressing invasion preparations. It seems that if the Japanese are ever willing to capitulate short of complete military defeat in the field they will do it when faced by the completely hopeless prospect occasioned by (1) destruction already wrought by air bombardment and sea blockade, coupled with (2) a landing on Japan indicating the firmness of our resolution, and also perhaps coupled with (3) the entry or threat of entry of Russia into the war.

6. With reference to clean-up of the Asiatic mainland, our objective should be to get the Russians to deal with the Japs in Manchuria (and Korea if necessary) and to vitalize the Chinese to a point where, with assistance of American air power and some supplies, they can mop up their own country.

7. Casualties. Our experience in the Pacific war is so diverse as to casualties that it is considered wrong to give any estimate in numbers. Using various combinations of Pacific experience, the War Department staff reaches the conclusion that the cost of securing a worth-while position in Korea would almost certainly be greater than the cost of the Kyushu operation. Points on the optimistic side of the Kyushu operation are that General MacArthur has not yet accepted responsibility for going ashore where there would be disproportionate casualties. The nature of the objective area gives room for maneuver, both on the land and by sea. As to any discussion of
specific operations, the following data is pertinent:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Campaign</th>
<th>U.S. Casualties</th>
<th>Jap Casualties</th>
<th>Ratio U.S. to Jap</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Killed, wounded, missing</td>
<td>Killed and prisoners (Not including wounded)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leyte</td>
<td>17,000</td>
<td>78,000</td>
<td>1:4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luzon</td>
<td>31,000</td>
<td>156,000</td>
<td>1:5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iwo Jima</td>
<td>20,000</td>
<td>25,000</td>
<td>1:1.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Okinawa</td>
<td>31,000 (ground), 7,700 (Navy)</td>
<td>51,000 (not a complete count)</td>
<td>1:2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normandy (1st 30 days)</td>
<td>42,000</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The record of General MacArthur's operations from 1 March 1944 through 1 May 1945 shows 13,722 U.S. killed compared to 310,169 Japanese killed, or a ratio of 22 to 1.

There is reason to believe that the first 30 days in Kyushu should not exceed the price we have paid for Luzon. It is a grim fact that there is not an easy, bloodless way to victory in war and it is the thankless task of the leaders to maintain their firm outward front which holds the resolution of their subordinates. Any irresolution in the leaders may result in costly weakening and indecision in the subordinates. It was this basic difficulty with the Prime Minister which clouded and hampered all our preparations for the cross-channel operation now demonstrated as having been essential to victory in Europe.

8. An important point about Russian participation in the war is that the impact of Russian entry on the already hopeless Japanese may well be the decisive action levering them into capitulation at that time or shortly thereafter if we land in Japan.

9. In considering the matter of command and control in the Pacific war which the British wish to raise at the next conference, we must bear in mind the point that anything weakening of combined command in the Pacific might increase the difficulties with Russia and perhaps with China. Furthermore the obvious inefficiencies of combined command may directly result in increased cost in resources and American lives.

J. R. E.