Activity: The Calculus of War: Tactics, Technology, and the Battle of the Atlantic

Guiding question:
How did changes in technology and tactics allow the Allies to win the Battle of the Atlantic?

DEVELOPED BY JOE BOYLE
Grade Level(s): 9-12
Subject(s): Social Studies
Cemetery Connection: Cambridge American Cemetery
Fallen Hero Connection: Seaman First Class Edwin W. Frazier
Overview

Using interactive technology from the American Battle Monuments Commission, maps, and primary and secondary sources, students will determine which technologies and tactics were most important in helping the Allies win the Battle of the Atlantic.

Historical Context

Many historians identify the Battle of the Atlantic as one of the deciding engagements of the European Theater of World War II. The deadly game of cat-and-mouse with German submarines threatened to cut off American men and materiel from the European Allies. Allied success in the North Atlantic was a precondition for any other Allied success in the European Theater of Operations. The United States Coast Guard had an unsung, and to many, unknown role in the successes in the Battle of the Atlantic. Seaman First Class Edwin Ward Frazier’s name appears on the Walls of the Missing at Cambridge American Cemetery, with many others who lost their lives in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Objectives

At the conclusion of this lesson, students will be able to

• Describe the role the U.S. Coast Guard played in the Battle of the Atlantic; and
• Evaluate the importance of new technologies and tactics in the Battle of the Atlantic.

Standards Connections

Connections to Common Core

CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.9-10.3 Determine the central ideas or information of a primary or secondary source; provide an accurate summary of how key events or ideas develop over the course of the text.

CCSS.ELA-Literacy.RH.11-12.2 Determine the central ideas or information of a primary or secondary source; provide an accurate summary that makes clear the relationships among the key details and ideas.
Connections to C3 Framework

**D2.Geo.11.9-12** Evaluate how economic globalization and the expanding use of scarce resources contribute to conflict and cooperation within and among countries.

**D2.His.1.9-12** Evaluate how historic events and developments were shaped by unique circumstance of time and place as well as broader historical contexts.

Documents Used ★ indicates an ABMC source

**Primary Sources**

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, February 23, 1942  
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum  
http://www.fdrlibrary.marist.edu/_resources/images/tully/6_03.pdf

Map of the World, 1942  
Library of Congress  
http://lccn.loc.gov/00556407

Photograph, USS *Leopold*, 1943  
United States Coast Guard  
http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/img/Leopold_1_300.jpg

**Secondary Sources**

*Cambridge American Cemetery Visitor’s Guide* ★  
American Battle Monuments Commission  

*Battle of the Atlantic Interactive* ★  
American Battle Monuments Commission  

**Materials**

- Mission Dossier Packet
- *Map of the World, 1942*
- Computer with internet capability to access *Battle of the Atlantic Interactive*
- Projector
- Speakers to listen to the Fireside Chat
- Transcript and audio of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Fireside Chat, February 23, 1942
Lesson Preparation

- Make one copy of the Mission Dossier packet for each student.
- Set up classroom technology, if necessary.
- Test all online resources before class.

Procedure

Activity One (45 minutes)

- Project the *Map of the World, 1942* in the front of the room. Ask students to identify the U.S. and Great Britain on the map. Have them identify the Port of New York, the Port of Liverpool, and the Port of Belfast. If the teacher does not have projection capabilities, use the map in the Mission Dossier workbook.
  - Ask the students to identify what they believe is the shortest, safest route between New York and the British ports.
  - Ask the students: *What would alter the route you chose? Are there things that would make you want to go closer to, or further away from, the islands and landmasses nearby?*
  - Ask the students: *In the grand scheme of a war in Europe, how important do you think moving men and equipment to battle would be?*
  - *Teacher Tip:* Push students to understand that without the men or equipment, it would be impossible to carry out any battles.
- Go to the *Battle of the Atlantic Interactive* and watch the first clip that sets up the major navies in World War II. Have students individually, or in groups, use this resource to complete the page on the seven major navies in the Mission Dossier.
  - Discuss their evaluations: *Which navy was in the best shape to wage the Battle of the Atlantic? Which navy was in the worst shape to wage war? Where did the U.S. fall in this ranking? What about Germany?*
- Have students read or listen to President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Fireside Chat from February 23, 1942 and answer the analysis questions in small groups or as a whole class.

Activity Two (45 minutes)

- Recap the previous day’s activities: *Which navies were at an advantage in the North Atlantic in 1941-1942? Which were at a disadvantage? Why was it so important to maintain control of the North Atlantic? What was Roosevelt’s message to the American people about how to take the battle to the enemy?*
- Introduce today’s topic: The technology and tactics of the Battle of the Atlantic.
Go to the **Battle of the Atlantic Interactive**. Click on “3 Sept 1939 – 9 April 1940” and watch introductory video.

- Have students use the “Briefing: 3 Sept 1939 – 9 April 1940” pop up window after the video. The selection box on the right side of the pop up window can be scrolled up and down to find the following topics. Students will complete a chart in the Mission Dossier on each identified technology, tactic, or organization that shaped the Battle of the Atlantic.

- Ask students to synthesize this information using the discussion questions in the Mission Dossier.

- Watch the introductory videos in the **Battle of the Atlantic Interactive** for 7 Dec 41 – 31 July 42, 1 Aug 42 – 21 May 43, and 22 May 43 – 31 Dec 1943. After watching these videos, close out of the dialogue box and look at the map in the background with your class. Ask if they notice a trend in what is represented on the map.

  - *Teacher Tip:* You are trying to elicit the idea that Allied shipping losses peak in the middle period, and German U-boat losses increase in the last period.

**Activity Three (45 minutes)**

- Introduce the day’s lesson: *Today, we will learn what a day in the life of a typical Coast Guardsman like Edwin Frazier was like on a destroyer escort.* Project a photograph of an Edsall-class destroyer escort, ask students to describe the vessel. Draw their attention to the size of the ship, the armament of the ship, the height of the ship.

- Have students open the Mission Dossier to the pages of information about the USS Leopold. Ask them to breeze through the page titled: *Leopold: Specifications* and see if anything draws their attention. Try to find a size comparison between the Leopold and your hallway, your school, width of your classroom, etc. Draw their attention to the fact that the Leopold was manned by an entirely Coast Guard crew. Ask them what they think living quarters would have been like for junior enlisted men like Frazier. Explain that the Coast Guard served vital roles as guardians of the East Coast ports, and as guardians of the convoys.

- Instruct students to read excerpts from the reports of the sinking of the Leopold, then answer questions about the disaster in the Dossier.

- Lead a discussion on the sinking of the Leopold. Prompts can include:

  - *What do you think could have been done differently to save a ship like the Leopold.*

  - *Looking at the date of the sinking of the Leopold, and the dates we looked at yesterday, what do these indicate about the ebb and flow of the Battle of the Atlantic?*

  - *At age 18, do you think you could have served as Frazier and the other young men of the Leopold did?*
• Lead a discussion on the cost of war. Prompts can include:
  ◦ When men died on the beaches at Normandy, it was clear to all that their deaths had purpose and meaning, and the American public lauded them as heroes. Were the deaths of the men in the convoys worth the price paid?

**Assessment**

• Assign the final piece of the lesson from the Mission Dossier.
• The Writing Assessment Rubric can be used to score the essay.

**Methods for Extension**

• Students with more interest in the role of the United States Coast Guard may research their role in protecting the homeland, which included Auxiliary patrols and beach patrols. They can also research the incredible, and obscure, role of the Coast Guard in the Greenland Patrol and weather patrols, which helped ensure the success of Allied operations in Europe.

• Much of this lesson could be used as homework with a more advanced group of students, who could then compare and contrast the Coast Guard’s role in World War II to its role in the Global War on Terrorism.

• The American Battle Monuments Commission maintains U.S. military cemeteries overseas. These cemeteries are permanent memorials to the fallen, but it is important that students know the stories of those who rest here. To learn more about the stories of some of the men and women who made the ultimate sacrifice, visit www.abmceducation.org/understandingsacrifice/abmc-sites.

**Adaptations**

• Teachers can adapt the project to younger learners by changing the focus of the last activity to a shorter essay. It could also be adapted to English Language Learners in a similar way. Younger learners could also do a smaller project comparing the roles of each of the uniformed services of the United States in less detail.

• Students can explore Roosevelt’s Fireside Chat as an audio source. This might be a particularly good starting point for younger students or English language learners since it automatically gives the ability to both read and hear the primary source text.

• Teachers can group students in several ways. One grouping strategy would be to have groups of heterogeneous ability work their way through the entire project. Another grouping strategy could assign each of the three major parts of the project to three heterogeneous groups, who could then teach it back to the other two groups.
Mission Dossier

_USS LEOPOLD (DE-319) launching, at Orange, Texas_  
June 12, 1943

U.S. Coast Guard (NH-83204)  
http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/leopold.asp
The Battle of the Atlantic

Envisioning the North Atlantic

North Atlantic Ocean, National Park Service

1. Identify the United States with an “X”
2. Identify Great Britain with a “Y”
3. Place a dot near the Port of New York
4. Place a dot near the Port of Belfast
5. Place a dot near the Port of Liverpool
6. Draw the route you would choose to get from New York to the British Isles.
   Consider: Would you want to stay closer to land?
# Naval Strengths Assessments

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<td><strong>What might they have done differently for more success?</strong></td>
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Naval Strength Assessment

Discussion Questions

Which navy do you believe was in the best shape to wage the Battle of the Atlantic?

Which navy was in the worst shape to wage war? Where did the U.S. fall in this ranking?

What about Germany?
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, February 23, 1942

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum

Franklin D. Roosevelt Library & Museum

Collection: Grace Tully Archive
Series: Grace Tully Papers
Box 6; Folder = FDR Inscribed Speeches:
Fireside Chat on Progress of the War, February 23, 1942
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, February 23, 1942

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum

We must fight at those vast distances to protect our supply lines and our lines of communication with our allies--protect those lines from the enemies who are bending every ounce of their strength, striving against time, to cut them. The object of the Axis and the Japanese is to separate the United States, Britain, China and Russia, and to isolate them one from another, so that each will be surrounded and cut off from sources of supplies and reinforcements. It is the old familiar axis policy of "divide and conquer".

There are those who still think in terms of the days of sailing-ships. They advise us to pull our war ships and our planes and our merchant ships into our own home waters and concentrate solely on last ditch defense. But let me illustrate what would happen if we followed such foolish advice.

Look at your map. Look at the vast area of China, with its millions of fighting men. Look at the vast area of Russia, with its powerful armies and proven military might. Look at the British Isles, Australia, New Zealand, the Dutch Indies, India, the Near East and the Continent of Africa, with their resources of raw materials and of people determined to resist any domination. Look at North America, Central America and South America.

It is obvious what would happen if all these great reservoirs of power were cut off from each other either by enemy action or by self-imposed isolation:

1. We could no longer send aid of any kind to China--to the brave people who, for nearly five years, have withstood Japanese assault, destroyed hundreds of thousands of Japanese soldiers, and vast quantities of Japanese war munitions. It is essential that we help China in her magnificent defense and in her inevitable counter-offensive--for that is one important element in the ultimate defeat of Japan.

2. If we lost communication with the southwest Pacific, all of that area, including Australia and New Zealand, would fall under Japanese domination. Japan could then release great numbers of ships and men to launch attacks on large scale against the coasts of the western Hemisphere, including Alaska. At the same time, she could immediately extend her conquests to India, and through the Indian Ocean, to Africa and the Near East.

3. If we were to stop sending munitions to the British and the Russians in the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf areas, we would help the Nazis to overrun Turkey, Syria, Iraq, Persia, Egypt and the Suez Canal, the whole coast of North Africa and the whole coast of East Africa--putting Germany within easy striking distance of South America.

4. If, by such a fatuous policy, we ceased to protect the North Atlantic supply line to Britain and to Russia, we would help to cripple the splendid counter-offensive by Russia against the Nazis, and we would help to deprive Britain of essential food-supplies and munitions.

Those Americans who believed that we could live under the illusion of isolationism wanted the American eagle to sit on the nest of the ostrich. Now, many of those same people, afraid that we may be sticking our necks out, want our national bird to be turned into a turtle. But we prefer to retain the eagle as it is--flying high and striking hard.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, February 23, 1942

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum

I know that I speak for the mass of the American people, when I say that we reject the turtle policy and will continue increasingly the policy of carrying the war to the enemy in distant lands and distant waters — as far as possible from our own home grounds.

There are four main lines of communication now being travelled by our ships: the North Atlantic, the South Atlantic, the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. These routes are not one-way streets — for the ships which carry our troops and munitions out-bound bring back essential raw materials which we require for our own use.

The maintenance of these vital lines is a very tough job. It is a job which requires tremendous daring, tremendous resourcefulness, and, above all, tremendous production of planes and tanks and guns and of the ships to carry them. And I speak again for the American people when I say that we can and will do that job.

The defense of the world-wide lines of communication demands relative safety for us of the sea and of the air along the various routes; and this, in turn, depends upon control by the United Nations of the strategic bases along these routes.

Control of the air involves the simultaneous use of two types of planes — first, the long-range heavy bombers; and, second, light bombers, dive bombers, torpedo planes, and medium-range pursuit planes which are essential to the protection of the bases and of the bombers themselves.

Heavy bombers can fly under their own power from home to the southwest Pacific; but the smaller planes cannot. Therefore, these lighter planes have to be packed in crates and sent on board range ships. Look at your map again and you will see that the route is long — and at many places perilous — either across the South Atlantic around South Africa, or from California to the West Indies direct. A vessel can make a round trip by either route in about four months, or only three round trips in a whole year.

In spite of the length and difficulties of this transportation, I can tell you that we already have a large number of bombers and pursuit planes, manned by American pilots, which are now in daily contact with the enemy in the Southwest Pacific. And thousands of American troops are today in that area engaged in operations not only in the air but on the ground as well.

In this battle area, Japan has had an obvious initial advantage. For she could fly over her short-range planes to the points of attack by using many stepping stones open to her — bases in a multitude of Pacific islands and also bases on the China, Indo-China, Thailand and Malay counts. Japanese troop transports could go south from Japan and China through the narrow China Sea which can be protected by Japanese planes throughout its whole length.

I ask you to look at your maps again, particularly at that portion of the Pacific Ocean lying west of Hawaii. Before this war even started, the Philippine Islands were already surrounded on three sides by Japanese power. On the west, the Japanese were in possession of the coast of China and the coast of Indo-China which had been yielded to them by the Dutch French. On the North, are the islands of Japan themselves, reaching down almost to northern Luzon. On the east, are the mandated islands — which Japan had occupied exclusively, and had fortified in absolute violation of her written word.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, February 23, 1942

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum

These islands, hundreds of them, appear only as small dots on most maps. But they cover a large strategic area. Guam lies in the middle of them -- a lone outpost which we never fortified.

Under the Washington Treaty of 1901 we had solemnly agreed not to add to the fortification of the Philippine Islands. We had no safe naval base there, so we could not use the islands for extensive naval operations.

Immediately after this war started, the Japanese forces moved down on either side of the Philippines to numerous points south of them -- thereby completely encircling the Islands from north, south, east and west.

It is that complete encirclement, with control of the air by Japanese land-based aircraft, which has prevented us from sending substantial reinforcements of men and material to the gallant defenders of the Philippines. For forty years it has always been our strategy -- a strategy born of necessity -- that in the event of a full-scale attack on the Islands by Japan, we should fight a delaying action, attempting to retire slowly into Bataan Peninsula and Corregidor.

We know that the war as a whole would have to be fought and won by a process of attrition against Japan itself. We know all along that, with our greater resources, we could outbuild Japan and ultimately overwhelm her on sea, on land and in the air. We know that, to obtain our objective, many varieties of operations would be necessary in areas other than the Philippines.

Nothing that has occurred in the past two months has caused us to revise this basic strategy -- except that the defenses put up by General MacArthur has magnificently exceeded the previous estimates; and he and his men are gaining eternal glory therefor.

MacArthur’s army of Filipinos and Americans, and the forces of the United Nations in China, in Burma and the Netherlands East Indies, are all together fulfilling the same essential task. They are making Japan pay an increasingly terrible price for her ambitious attempts to seize control of the whole Asiatic world. Every Japanese transport sunk off Java is one less transport that they can use to carry reinforcements to their army opposing General MacArthur in Bataan.

It has been said that Japanese gains in the Philippines were made possible only by the success of their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. I tell you that this is not so.

Even if the attack had not been made, your map will show that it would have been a hopeless operation for us to send the Fleet to the Philippines through thousands of miles of ocean, while all these island bases were under the sole control of the Japanese.

The consequences of the attack on Pearl Harbor -- serious as they were -- have been wildly exaggerated in other ways. These exaggerations come originally from Axis propaganda; but they have been repeated, I regret to say, by Americans in and out of public life.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, February 23, 1942
Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum

You and I have the utmost contempt for Americans who, since Pearl Harbor, have whispered or announced "off the record" that there was no longer any Pacific Fleet -- that the Fleet was all sunk or destroyed on December 7th -- that more than 1,000 of our planes were destroyed on the ground. They have suggested deftly that the government has withheld the truth about casualties -- that eleven or twelve thousand men were killed at Pearl Harbor instead of the figures as officially announced. They have even served the enemy propagandists by spreading the incredible story that shiploads of bodies of our honored American dead were about to arrive in New York harbor to be put in a common grave.

Almost every axis broadcast directly quotes Americans who, by speech or in the press, make damnable misstatements such as these.

The American people realize that many cases of official operations cannot be disclosed until we are absolutely certain that the announcement will not give to the enemy military information which he does not already possess.

Your government has unmistakable confidence in your ability to bear the worst, without flinching or losing heart. You must, in turn, have complete confidence that your government is keeping nothing from you except information that will help the enemy in his attempt to destroy us. In a democracy there is always a solemn pact of truth between government and the people; but there must also always be a full way of discretion -- and that word "discretion" applies to the critics of government as well.

This is war. The American people want to know, and will be told, the general trend of how the war is going. But they do not wish to help the eneuy any more than our fighting forces do; and they will pay little attention to the rumor-mongers and panic peddlers in our midst.

To pass from the realm of rumor to the field of facts: the number of our officers and men killed in the attack on Pearl Harbor on December seventh was 2,400, and the number wounded was 946. Of all the combatant ships based on Pearl Harbor -- battleships, heavy cruisers, light cruisers, aircraft carriers, destroyers and submarines -- only these were permanently put out of commission.

Very many of the ships of the Pacific Fleet were not even in Pearl Harbor. Some of these that were there were hit very slightly; and others that were damaged have either rejoined the Fleet by now or are still undergoing repairs. When those repairs are completed, the ships will be more efficient fighting machines than they were before.

The report that we lost more than a thousand airplanes at Pearl Harbor is as baseless as the other wild rumors. The Japanese do not know just how many planes they destroyed that day, and I am not going to tell them. But I can say that to-date -- including Pearl Harbor -- we have destroyed considerably more Japanese planes than they have destroyed of ours.
We have most certainly suffered losses — from Hitler’s U-Boats in the Atlantic as well as from the Japanese in the Pacific — and we shall suffer more of them before the turn of the tide. But, speaking for the United States of America, let me say once and for all to the people of the world: We Americans have been compelled to yield ground, but we will regain it. We and the other United Nations are committed to the destruction of the militarism of Japan and Germany. We are daily increasing our strength. Soon, we and not our enemies, will have the offensive; we, not they, will win the final battles; and we, not they, will make the final peace.

Conquered nations in Europe know what the yoke of the Nazis is like. And the people of Korea and of Manchuria know in their flesh the harsh despotism of Japan. All of the people of Asia know that if there is to be an honorable and decent future for any of them or for us, that future depends on victory by the United Nations over the forces of Asian enslavement.

If a just and durable peace is to be attained, or even if all of us are merely to save our own skins, there is one thought for us here at home to keep uppermost — the fulfillment of our special task of production.

Germany, Italy and Japan are very close to their maximum output of planes, guns, tanks and ships. The United Nations are not — especially the United States of America.

Our first job then is to build up production so that the United Nations can maintain control of the seas and attain control of the air — not merely a slight superiority, but an overwhelming superiority.

On January 6th of this year, I set certain definite goals of production for airplanes, tanks, guns and ships. The Axis propagandists called them fantastic. Tonight, nearly two months later, and after a careful survey of progress by Donald Nelson and others charged with responsibility for our production, I can tell you that those goals will be attained.

In every part of the country, experts in production and the men and women at work in the plants are giving loyal service. With few exceptions, labor, capital and farming realize that this is no time either to make undue profits or to gain special advantages, one over the other.

We are calling for new plants and additions to old plants and for plant conversion to war needs. We are seeking more men and more women to run them. We are working longer hours. We are coming to realize that one extra plane or extra tank or extra gun or extra ship completed tomorrow may, in a few months, turn the tide on some distant battlefield; it may make the difference between life and death for some of our fighting men.

We know now that if we lose this war it will be generations or even centuries before our concepts of democracy can live again. And we can lose this war only if we slow up our effort or if we waste our ammunition shooting at each other.

Here are three high purposes for every American:

1. We shall not stop work for a single day. If any dispute arises we shall keep on working while the dispute is solved by mediation, conciliation or arbitration — until the war is won.
2. We shall not demand special gains or special privileges or advantages for any one group or occupation.

3. We shall give up conveniences and modify the routine of our lives if our country asks us to do so. We will do it cheerfully, remembering that the common enemy seeks to destroy every home and every freedom in every part of our land.

This generation of Americans has come to realize, with a present and personal realization, that there is something larger and more important than the life of any individual or of any individual group — something for which a man will sacrifice, and gladly sacrifice, not only his pleasures, not only his goods, not only his associations with those he loves, but his life itself. In time of crisis when the future is in the balance, we came to understand, with full recognition and devotion, what this nation is, and what we owe to it.

The Axis propagandists have tried in various evil ways to destroy our determination and our morale. Failing in that, they are now trying to destroy our confidence in our own allies. They say that the British are finished — that the Russians and the Chinese are about to quit. Patriotic and sensible Americans will reject these absurdities. And instead of listening to any of this crude propaganda, they will recall some of the things that Nazi and Japanese have said and are still saying about us.

Ever since this nation became the arsenal of democracy — ever since entrance of Lend-Lease — there has been one persistent theme through all Axis propaganda.

This theme has been that Americans are admittedly rich, and that America have considerable industrial power — but that Americans are soft and decadent, that they cannot and will not unite and work and fight.

From Berlin, Rome and Tokyo we have been described as a nation of weaklings — “playboys” — who would hire British soldiers, or Russian soldiers, or Chinese soldiers to do our fighting for us.

Let them repeat that now:

Let them tell that to General MacArthur and his men.

Let them tell that to the sailors who today are hitting hard in the far waters of the Pacific.

Let them tell that to the boys in the Flying Fortresses.

Let them tell that to the Marines:

The United Nations constitute an association of independent peoples of equal dignity and importance. The United Nations are dedicated to a common cause. We share equally and with equal zeal the anguish and awful sacrifices of war. In the partnership of our common enterprise, we must share in a unified plan in which all of us must play our several parts, each of us being equally indispensable and dependent one on the other.

We have unified command and cooperation and comradeship.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, February 23, 1942

Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library and Museum

We Americans will contribute unified production and unified acceptance of sacrifice and of effort. That means a national unity that can know no limitations of race or creed or selfish politics. The American people expect that much from themselves. And the American people will find ways and means of expressing their determination to their enemies, including the Japanese Admiral who has said that he will dictate the terms of peace here in the White House.

We of the United Nations are agreed on certain broad principles in the kind of peace we seek. The Atlantic Charter applies not only to the parts of the world that border the Atlantic but to the whole world; disarmament of aggressors, self-determination of nations and peoples, and the four freedoms — freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from want, and freedom from fear.

The British and the Russian people have known the full fury of Nazi onslaught. There have been times when the fate of London and Moscow was in serious doubt. But there was never the slightest question that either the British or the Russians would yield. And today all the United Nations salute the superb Russian Army as it celebrates the twenty-fourth anniversary of its first assembly.

Though their homeland was overrun, the Dutch people are still fighting stubbornly and powerfully overseas.

The great Chinese people have suffered grievous losses; Chungking has been almost wiped out of existence — yet it remains the capital of an unbeatable China.

That is the conquering spirit which prevails throughout the United Nations in this war.

That task that we Americans now face will test us to the utmost.

Never before have we been called upon for such a prodigious effort. Never before have we had so little time in which to do so much.

"These are the times that try men's souls."

Thomas Paine wrote those words on a drum-head, by the light of a campfire. That was when Washington's little army of ragged, ragged men was retreating across New Jersey, having tasted nothing but defeat.

And General Washington ordered that those great words written by Thomas Paine be read to the men of every regiment in the Continental Army, and this was the assurance given to the first American armed forces:

"The summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their country; but he that stands it now, deserves the love and thanks of man and woman. Tyranny, like hell, is not easily conquered; yet we have this consolation with us, that the harder the sacrifice, the more glorious the triumph."

So spoke Americans in the year 1776.

So speak Americans today!

Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat, February 23, 1942
Discussion Prompts for
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Fireside Chat, February 23, 1942

1. Find and underline two pieces of evidence that show that FDR considered the North Atlantic one of the most critical battlefields in the world.

2. What does FDR identify as the three major goals toward which every American should strive?

3. How does FDR use the symbolism of Washington’s Birthday in this speech?

4. How does FDR say that the role of oceans has changed for Americans?

5. What does FDR say would happen if we pulled our naval forces back to American borders for a “last-ditch defense?”
# Technology and Tactics of the Battle of the Atlantic

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### Technology and Tactics of the Battle of the Atlantic (continued)

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<td><strong>Coast Guard Auxiliary</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Destroyer Escorts</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Escort Carrier</strong></td>
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<td><strong>HF/DF (High Frequency Direction Finding)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Magnetic Mines</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Milch Cows</strong></td>
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Technology and Tactics of the Battle of the Atlantic (continued)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Who?</th>
<th>How did it work?</th>
<th>Who did it benefit?</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Snorkel Devices</td>
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<tr>
<td>US Coast Guard</td>
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</tbody>
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Technology and Tactics of the Battle of the Atlantic

Discussion Questions

Which side do you think had the technological advantage?

Which side do you think had the tactical advantage?

What do you think each side should have focused on MORE to either change the outcome of the battle, or speed up the outcome of the battle?
Fact Sheet: Destroyer Escorts

Destroyer Escorts (DE’s) were an entirely new class of naval ship unique to World War II, and in particular, unique to the Battle of the Atlantic.

In 1939, the U.S. Navy recognized the need for a ship that would be easy to build, small, light, and just a little quicker than merchant ships to serve as the sheepdogs protecting flocks of cargo ships resupplying U.S. forces in a potential European war.

The building orders were not issued until the beginning of American involvement in World War II in late 1941; hence, the first ships did not get delivered until January 1943.

But as soon as the DE’s were introduced, they changed the balance of power in the North Atlantic. Using sonar, radar, and high frequency direction finding gear, the DE’s mission were to seek out and destroy German submarines.

Throughout the war, 563 destroyer escorts were built for the U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard. Eighty-five of these first models of DE’s were the Edsall-class. All of the destroyers in this class were named after U.S. Navy heroes already killed earlier in the war.

Edsall-class destroyers were 306 feet long, and about 36 feet wide at their widest spot. They were designed to carry a crew of 15 officers and 201 enlisted men. The Edsalls could travel at a top speed of 24 miles per hour. They were armed with three 3-inch guns and one 40mm Bofors. For short-range targets, they carried a 20mm Oerlikon cannon. But their most important weapons were their anti-submarine devices, which included two depth charge tracks, eight depth charge projectors, and one hedgehog.

To learn more, go to:
http://destroyerhistory.org/de/edsallclass/
http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/leopold.asp
Fact Sheet: United States Coast Guard

During peacetime, the U.S. Coast Guard is a multi-mission maritime force, with jobs including fisheries maintenance, upkeep of aids to navigation, border security, and asset protection. During times of war, however, the Coast Guard is frequently assigned to combat and support roles under the U.S. Navy in addition to its homeland defense responsibilities.

In the Battle of the Atlantic, both the civil and military missions of the Coast Guard were critical. Before the United States even entered World War II, Coast Guard cutters were deployed to the North Atlantic as part of the “Greenland Patrol,” which not only defended that strategic island, but also provided weather information to Allied forces in Northern Europe throughout the war.

Back home, the U.S. Coast Guard Auxiliary, a non-military, volunteer organization, took an active role on the Atlantic Coast. “They brought in survivors from sub-scuttled ships. They patrolled the waterfronts. They went off-shore in small boats in hurricane weather,” said an official Auxiliary history.

The regular Coast Guard and reserve took on critical military functions along the Atlantic, Pacific, and Gulf coasts. Port security took on increased importance, and Coast Guard ships and personnel protected ships and harbors. Coast Guardsmen – many times horse-mounted – patrolled thousands of miles of beaches throughout the nation to spot saboteurs, spies, and subs.

Some of the most notable U.S. Coast Guard jobs, however, took place hundreds and thousands of miles away from the actual coast of the United States. Thousands of Coast Guardsmen were selected to be officers and crew aboard Navy vessels in every theater of the war. Among these were the Coast Guard-crewed destroyer escorts of Escort Division 22. Dozens of Coast Guard-crewed destroyer escorts protected important convoys of men and materiel across the Atlantic – and, it can be argued, helped turn the tide of the war.
Fact Sheet: USS Leopold

**Namesake:** ENS Robert Lawrence Leopold, USN. Leopold was a 25-year-old officer aboard USS Arizona on December 7, 1941. He was killed in action, and his body was never recovered.

**Displacement:** 1.253 tons

**Length:** 306 feet

**Beam** (Width at widest point): 36 feet, 7 inches

**Draft** (how deep below the water): 10 feet, 5 inches

**Power:** Two-shaft Fairbanks Morse diesel engines

**Range:** 10,800 nautical miles

**Top speed:** 21 knots (24 miles per hour)

**Armament:** Three 3-inch guns; Two 40mm guns; Eight 20mm guns; Three 21-inch torpedo tubes; Two depth charge tracks; Eight depth charge projectors; One hedgehog.

**Launched:** 12 June 1943

**Commissioned:** 18 October 1943 in Orange, Texas.

**First mission:** 24 December 1943, escorted convoy to the Mediterranean.

**Second mission:** 1 March 1944, leaves Maine with the entirely-Coast Guard crewed Escort Division 22 to escort a 27 merchant ship convoy to Great Britain. On 9 March, is sunk by a German submarine.
Source Analysis: The Sinking of the USS *Leopold*

**DECLASSIFIED**

**Authority:** E.O. 13526  
**By:** NDC  **NARA Date:** Dec 31, 2012

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**U.S.S. POOLE (DE-151)**  
c/o Fleet Post Office, New York, N.Y.

**A4-1**  
SECRET

**15 March, 1944**

**From:**  
Commander Task Group 21.5

**To:**  
Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

**Subject:**  
USS *LEOPOLD* (DE-319); torpedoing of, 9 March, 1944.

**Inclosure:**  
(A) Copy of report from Commanding Officer, USS *JOYCE* - p.5

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1. At about 1900 (N) (Convoy Time), 9 March, 1944, Convoy CU-15, escorted by Escort Division 22, Task Group 21.5, was proceeding on course 90° T from Point IX (58° 45' N - 26° 29' W). The convoy was in seven (7) columns, twenty-seven (27) ships; convoy guide ship #41; speed 14.5 knots. The sea was moderate, with moderate westerly swell, moderate westerly wind, sky partly overcast with heavy patches of clouds, moonlight, visibility excellent, horizon sharp and clear. At 1920 escorts were ordered to take night stations. The screen plan was as follows, all bearings relative from convoy guide and distances in yards:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Ship Name</th>
<th>Bearing</th>
<th>Distance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>USS <em>POOLE</em></td>
<td>30°</td>
<td>3500 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>USS <em>HARVEISON</em></td>
<td>330°</td>
<td>3500 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>USS <em>JOYCE</em></td>
<td>65°</td>
<td>5000 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>USS <em>KIRKPATRICK</em></td>
<td>295°</td>
<td>5000 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>USS <em>LEOPOLD</em></td>
<td>105°</td>
<td>5500 yards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>USS <em>PETERSON</em></td>
<td>255°</td>
<td>5500 yards</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

At 1945 the C.I.C. plot showed the *LEOPOLD* as bearing 205° T, 6700 yards from the convoy guide. At 1950 the *LEOPOLD* reported via TBS a SL radar contact bearing 190° T, range 8000 yards from the *LEOPOLD*. This placed the contact about 200° T, 14000 yards from the convoy guide. This distance can be in error as much as a thousand (1000) yards as it is believed that the *LEOPOLD* was closing the convoy between 1945 and 1950 to take her night stations. All escorts were patrolling stations. The convoy was not zig-zagging. The speed of escorts was 15.5 knots. At 2000 position was 58° 44' N, 25° 50' W. About 1955 *LEOPOLD* sent TBS message "this looks like the real thing". Convoy commodore was notified and ordered to...

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67771 - 1 -
have convoy commence zig-zagging. The JOYCE was ordered to assist the LEOPOLD. About 2000 LEOPOLD fired two (2) star shells, one bursting below the clouds, the other in a cloud base. Before second burst, the LEOPOLD was observed to commence firing. From the direction of the fire, the LEOPOLD at this time appeared to be between the target and the convoy. The JOYCE was closing the scene of action rapidly. Escorts in the screen were ordered to equalize stations, the POOLE covering the starboard van sector. During this interval, the JOYCE was heard to call the LEOPOLD requesting any instructions for concerted attack. At 2020 the JOYCE advised unable to communicate with the LEOPOLD. Radar screen showed JOYCE closing position of the LEOPOLD. At 2023 JOYCE advised that the LEOPOLD appeared low in the water, apparently had been torpedoed. At 2026 the JOYCE reported being close enough to observe the LEOPOLD damaged and crew abandoning ship. At 2030 JOYCE reported evading a torpedo picked up in her SONAR gear. Escorts were ordered to take screening stations for four (4) escorts in accordance with pre-arranged plans. At 2100 the JOYCE passed out of the range of TES and contact was established on 2410 Kc. At 2130 the radioman on EW/DF watch on the POOLE intercepted signals believed to come from enemy sources on about 425 Kc., strength 4 to 5, bearing 121° T. Another station bearing about 108° T apparently received for the signals. The strength of this signal was 3. The convoy had had air coverage that day. At 2213 plane 157-1-2 (Iceland based) closed convoy and asked if he could assist. He was requested to fly around convoy at maximum visibility. At 2305 plane 157-1-6 reported and asked for instructions. He was requested to fly west for about 55 miles, contact the JOYCE and give air coverage and any assistance. The plane established contact with JOYCE at 2347 and remained until the following morning. At 2400 convoy time was changed to Zebra time in accordance with prior orders. 10 March at 0115 JOYCE reported LEOPOLD as having broken in two and was a total loss. JOYCE was ordered to remain in vicinity until daylight to pick up survivors and to sink any part of the LEOPOLD that might be floating. JOYCE reported the stern section of the LEOPOLD as having
DECLASSIFIED

Authority: E.O. 13526
By: NDC  NARA Date: Dec 31, 2012

SECRET

From: Commander Task Group 21.5
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.

Subject: USS LEOPOLD (DX-319); torpedoing of, 9 March, 1944.

---

Morning

The submarine which torpedoed the LEOPOLD is believed to have been the one reported patrolling lane extending from 50° N to 60° N, approximate longitude 25°. On March 1 through the 5th, a submarine had also been reported as having been patrolling station vicinity of 59° N 30° W. It might possibly have been this one. On 8 March at 2312Z, the LEOPOLD, the only escort in the convoy equipped with HF/DF, had intercepted a high frequency signal, ground wave, 4190 Kc., strength 5, the code groups being identified as a possible enemy weather report. The position of transmitting station was estimated as being within 100 miles, the bearing 030° from position 5640 N 3307 W. An altercation in the course of the convoy was made to the eastward on the strength of this interception.

Had more escorts been available, another would have been ordered to assist the JOYCE. The Escort Commander felt, however, that with twenty-seven (27) ships, and detaching the JOYCE, four (4) remaining escorts were little enough to properly protect the convoy, in view of the fact that the presence of other submarines was entirely possible. Better results might have been obtained in the search for the enemy submarine had additional escorts been available to join the JOYCE.

In enclosure (A) is a copy of the report of the commanding officer of the JOYCE for his operations of the night 9-10 March, 1944.

All escorts had FIX gear streamed as the use of such gear was doctrine in the Task Group. It is assumed that the LEOPOLD had streamed her's prior to intercepting her target. The LEOPOLD was apparently hit amidships. No opinion can be given in the case of...
From: Commander Task Group 21.5
To: Commander in Chief, U. S. Fleet.
Subject: USS LEOPOLD (DE-319); torpedoing of, 9 March, 1944.

the LEOPOLD, whether or not the FXR gear was working. From trials on the POOLE, the performance of the FXR gear is erratic at all speeds and subject to rapid material failure at eighteen (18) knots or above. Unfortunately, no data is available, due to the fact that all officers on the LEOPOLD are missing, as to just what tactics were used by the LEOPOLD during the attack. When last seen, the LEOPOLD was apparently placing herself between the submarine and the convoy on a collision course at full speed.

W. W. KENNER
Captain, U.S.C.G.

Copies to:
Comdeslant
CinCLant

Document credit:
DE-317 (FAR)/AL
Serial No. 027

CONFIDENTIAL

From: The Commanding Officer,
To: The Commander, Escort Division Twenty-two.

Subject: USS LEOPOLD (DE-319); torpedoing of.

On the night of 9 March, 1944, this vessel was in night station 3 of convoy escorts under your command. The following is the account of the operations of this ship during the night; all times, zone plus one:

At 1550, called all hands to general quarters stations; USS LEOPOLD (DE-319) on station 3 investigating radar target on starboard side of convoy, bearing 190° T, 4 miles from USS LEOPOLD (DE-319). 1557 ordered by CTG 21.5 to assist USS LEOPOLD (DE-319); various courses; speed 41 knots, proceeding as ordered. 1558 USS LEOPOLD (DE-319) commenced firing on radar target she illuminated with star shell and opened fire to port with all forward guns; after approximately 20 seconds, ceased firing. Target was not visible to us. 2005 took station on port beam of USS LEOPOLD (DE-319), distance approximately 2500 yards; changed speed to 15 knots. 2111 USS LEOPOLD (DE-319) failed to answer PBs or flashing light; investigating, closed range to 1500 yards at various courses and speeds. 2115 observed USS LEOPOLD (DE-319) to be dead in the water, with hole in port side in compartments B-1 and B-2 and with her back broken; screws out of water; and crew abandoning ship; commenced searching area for submarine; ordered by CTG 21.5 to use own best judgment. 2208 picked up torpedo on QCT-1. Commenced maneuvering to evade torpedo. 2236 clear of torpedo, recommenced search of area. 2250 completed search of area without making contact, proceeding to pick up survivors; USS LEOPOLD (DE-319) now broken in half, bow and stern section separating with the stern section drifting downwind (about 060° T) faster. 2120 stopped to pick up survivors, conducting 360° listening search. 2127 survivors alongside. 2132 picked up torpedo on QCT-1 and sighted torpedo track on port beam; commenced maneuvering to evade torpedo. 2142 clear of torpedo, recommenced search of area. 2212 completed search of area without making contact, proceeding to pick up survivors. 2218 commenced picking up survivors, proceeding on various courses and at various speeds conducting JK listening search while picking up survivors. 0045 on...
DE-317(FAIR)/AL Serial No. 027 CONFIDENTIAL 12 March, 1944

10 March, 1944, the stern section of USS LEOPOLD (DE-319) sank; depth charges exploded. 0046 searching area on various courses and at various speeds; making sound and radar search and looking for further survivors. 0114 received orders from CTG 21.5 to remain in vicinity of LEOPOLD until daylight and to sink all wreckage before leaving. Secured from general quarters with a total of twenty-eight (28) survivors and three (3) bodies on board. 0710 called all hands to general quarters for the purpose of sinking bow section of USS LEOPOLD (DE-319) by gun fire. 0719 commenced firing on wreck with numbers one, two, and three 3”/50 guns, and starboard 20 MM guns. 0722 ceased firing. 0727 commenced firing on wreck. 0739 ceased firing. 0740 fired one depth charge from projector and dropped one from stern racks close to wreck. 0747 commenced firing at wreck with numbers one, two, and three 3”/50 guns, 40 MM gun, and port 20 MM guns. 0749 ceased firing. Expended 12 rounds 3”/50 caliber AP; 6 rounds 3”/50 caliber AA; 32 rounds 40 MM ammunition and 240 rounds of 20 MM ammunition. 0754 bow section of USS LEOPOLD (DE-319) sank.

2. Apparently the LEOPOLD headed immediately to intercept a target contact. The target which was downwind and possibly in path of a bright moon was sighted visually from the LEOPOLD at a range of about 2000 yards and fire was opened, the target bearing approximately 350° relative. I observed the LEOPOLD to fire two illuminating shells, about four or five 3 inch shells, and heavy 20 MM fire from forward batteries. The submarine was reported by survivors to be crashing immediately after fire was opened. Last range reported by radar was 700 yards, with target bearing 000° relative. There is some question whether the LEOPOLD was struck by the torpedo from the port or starboard side. From personal observation, I can only say that there was a much larger hole on the port side than there was on the starboard side of the LEOPOLD. Although the LEOPOLD was approximately 5000 yards away from this ship when she was hit, no one on board the JOYCE was aware that the LEOPOLD had been damaged until the range closed to about 1500 yards where it could plainly be seen that the LEOPOLD was in a bad way. I believe that her FXR gear was stream-lined, inasmuch as this vessel was asked if we could hear her FNR gear at about 1500 on 9 March.

3. It will be noted from the first paragraph that the LEOPOLD’s depth charges exploded when the stern section sank. I am at loss as to the reason for this, as I am convinced that all charges were on safe. One of the survivors stated that charges were checked three (3) times to be sure they were on safe. Furthermore, before the stern section sank, the fantail rose high in the air and in doing so I am certain that some
DE-317(FMR)/A4  CONFIDENTIAL  12 March, 1944
Serial No. 027

of the depth charges must have rolled off into the water; these did not explode.

4. In connection with the operation of the FMR gear, I do not consider present gear satisfactory, inasmuch as pendants have repeatedly broken when towed at 20 knots. Believe condition can be rectified by using one-half inch pendants of best grade plow steel.

5. It is recommended that floater nets be replaced with liferafts. From testimony of survivors and from the fact that no survivors were recovered from floater nets, I am of the opinion that they are dangerous to the safety of the men who use them. It is also recommended that the wearing of individual life jacket lights be mandatory. Furthermore, any vessel which will be used for rescuing men from the water should be provided with about four (4) rubber life suits, suitable belts and lines, so that rescuing ship may put men in the water for extended periods to assist helpless swimmers on board.

6. The plane coverage proved a great help in spotting men in the water and was also a boost in morale to know there was someone around to give you a hand. The conduct of the crew of this ship was above reproach. There was several cases where men from the JOYCE risked their lives in picking up survivors from the water. I am recommending by separate correspondence these men for the Navy and Marine Corps Medal.

7. From talking to the survivors, I know you will be pleased to hear that the conduct of the officers of the LEOPOLD was an inspiration to all hands. From personal observation of the LEOPOLD's crew, their behavior was in keeping with the best tradition of our service.

/s/ Robert Wilcox
ROBERT WILCOX

- 3 -
Source Analysis: The Sinking of the USS Leopold

Analysis Questions

1. How did HF/DF play a role in the sinking of the Leopold and the hunt for the sub that sank her?

2. What role did Allied air cover play in the hunt for the German submarine? What role did it play relating to the morale of the sailors in the convoy?
3. FXR gear (Also known as “Foxer”) was a noise-making device towed by the American convoy ships to try to decoy torpedoes away from the actual ship itself. What problems did the commander of USS Joyce identify with FXR gear at this point in the Battle of the Atlantic?

4. What do you think could have been done to minimize the loss of life from the sinking of the Leopold?
The People behind the Story:

Seaman First Class Edwin Ward Frazier

Nearly 200 enlisted Coast Guardsmen served aboard the USS Leopold. Among them was a man just three weeks shy of his nineteenth birthday, Edwin Ward Frazier. Known to his friends as either “Ward,” or “Bud,” Frazier was born and raised on the east side of Toledo, Ohio.

Frazier’s school career was remarkably unremarkable. School officials rated his family life as a “5” out of 5, and marked him high for flexibility, leadership, and dependability. He played football his freshman and sophomore years – lining up alongside three other boys who would be killed in World War II. Frazier took two industrial arts survey courses at Morrison R. Waite High School, just six blocks from his home.

But in the second semester of his junior year, Frazier left high school. He first went to a National Youth Administration camp in central Ohio, where he learned to operate machinery for two months. A month after returning to Toledo, the 17-year-old Frazier got his parents’ permission to join the United States Coast Guard.

Frazier applied for enlistment on July 8, 1942 at the Coast Guard’s Toledo buoy station, just across the Maumee River from his neighborhood. He submitted an extensive background check, including questionnaires filled out by the city police department, his neighbors on Valleywood Street, and his grade school and high school principals. Less than two weeks
later, Frazier was sent to the Coast Guard Recruiting Office in nearby Detroit, Michigan for physical and mental testing.

The Coast Guard’s training program during World War II was much more akin to a skilled trades apprenticeship than what Army and Marine Corps recruits underwent in World War II. Frazier first was assigned to the Coast Guard small boat station in Marblehead, Ohio, about 50 miles from his hometown. After five months of learning the ropes in Marblehead, Frazier served in Buffalo, New York, Miami, Florida, and Norfolk, Virginia before being assigned to Texas to join the crew of the brand-new USS *Leopold* on the date of her commissioning in October 1943.

Frazier – just 18 years old – indeed got to see much of the world from aboard the *Leopold* over the next six months. The ship sailed to Bermuda, Gibraltar, Morocco, and back home to ports up and down the Atlantic seaboard, including New York City. For Frazier, and likely for many of the other men on the ship, it was the furthest he had ever traveled from home.

On March 1, 1944, the *Leopold* sailed for Maine, where it formed up with Escort Division 22 to guide 20 tankers and seven cargo ships to British ports. The *Leopold* was sunk by U-255 on March 9, 1944. Ward Frazier was one of the 171 Coast Guard officers and men lost aboard the ship.
Prompt: Why was the Battle of the Atlantic the critical battle in winning the European war? Use evidence to support your argument in a short essay of no more than 500 words.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Advanced</th>
<th>Proficient</th>
<th>Basic</th>
<th>Emerging</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Content</strong></td>
<td>Passage addresses all five W’s (who, what, when, where and how).</td>
<td>Passage clearly addresses four of the five W’s (who, what, when, where and how).</td>
<td>Passage adequately addresses three of the five W’s (who, what, when, where and how).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Historical Thinking</strong></td>
<td>All details and/or examples presented in the passage are accurate and fully explained.</td>
<td>Almost all details/examples are accurate and fully explained.</td>
<td>Most facts presented are accurate (70%) and fully explained.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MUGS (Mechanics, Usage, Grammar, Spelling)</strong></td>
<td>No errors in MUGS</td>
<td>Almost no errors in MUGS (better than 90%)</td>
<td>Few errors in MUGS (better than 75%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Map of the World, 1942

Library of Congress
Photograph, USS *Leopold*, 1943

United States Coast Guard